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Abstract 
Despite substantial financial aid from international donors for procurement of health products, stockouts 
of life-saving drugs related to prevalent infectious diseases are still widespread in Africa. Addressing the 
lack of research on why these stockouts occur, we study the relationship between The Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and its grant recipients. Specifically, we leverage extensive 
historical fund disbursement and drug procurement data to build a discrete-event simulation model 
predicting the joint impact of procurement and grant disbursement processes on national drug availability 
for the Global Fund’s recipient countries in Africa. This model is validated against cumulative stockout 
levels inferred from historical grant implementation lengths, and used to evaluate potential high-level 
modifications of disbursement or procurement processes. Results show the existence of substantial 
intrinsic stockout risks in many countries, due to the unpredictability of fund disbursements and the 
frequency of grant performance monitoring performed by the Global Fund. Interventions increasing fund 
disbursement levels to protect against disbursement timing uncertainty are predicted to be more effective 
than others that include regional buffer stocks and bridge financing. 
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1. Introduction 
Twenty-five years ago, almost one-third of the world’s population did not have access to essential 
medicines (Foster et al. 2006). Major trends in global health since then include the emergence of new 
actors such as The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), the Global 
Alliance on Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI), the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation as well as budget 
increases of bilateral donors such as the US and UK governments (Atun et al. 2012). This has resulted in 
a significant increase of international funding for health programs in low-income countries (currently US 
$27 billion a year, see IHME 2013, Yadav 2010). Unfortunately, communicable diseases treatable in the 
developed world remain widespread: HIV/AIDS remains the leading cause of adult death in Africa with 
estimated 23 million people living with HIV at the end of 2011 and 2.5 million new infections a year 
(United Nations 2013); malaria and tuberculosis combined led to over 2 million deaths in 2011, again 
mostly in Africa (WHO 2013a and 2013b). 
Established in 2002, The Global Fund is currently the world's largest external financier of HIV, 
tuberculosis and malaria programs. Funded by countries such as the United States (29% of total paid to 
date), France (13%), the United Kingdom (9%) and Germany (7%); private foundations such as the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation (5%); and corporations such as Chevron (0.2%), by October 2012 it had 
committed US $22.9 billion to prevention, treatment and care in 151 low and medium-income countries. 
This includes US $9.2bn (around 40%) for procuring medicines and health products, and US$9bn (around 
38%) for strengthening health systems (Global Fund 2012a). A key feature of The Global Fund that has 
been material to its ability to raise funds from donors is performance-based financing. In this financing 
model, proper use of past funds and the achievement of predefined results by grant recipients (e.g., 
number of patients treated, number of doctors trained, number of facilities opened) become prerequisites 
for future disbursements by the Global Fund (Center for Global Development 2013).  
Despite the positive impact of Global Fund-supported programs (Brugha et al. 2004), stockouts of 
health products at health facility (peripheral) and national level (e.g. central warehouse) are widespread in 
countries receiving Global Fund financing, particularly in Africa (Yu et al. 2008, PLoS Medicine Editors 
2009, Oliynyk 2011): in a 2009 survey, 9 out of 14 surveyed African countries reported stockout of at 
least one type of medicines related to Global Fund grants within the last year, 4 reported stockouts of two 
or more types, and all reported at least one near-stockout situation (Global Fund 2009). Stockouts cause 
treatment interruptions, loss of confidence in health systems and providers, increased risks of drug 
resistance and adverse effects on disease epidemiology. Consequently, stockouts lead to increased 
morbidity and mortality for a large number of patients receiving treatment for AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria and pose a major challenge to public health (WHO 2004, Levine et al. 2008, Hawkes 2011). In 
general, stockouts of medicines in Africa have been attributed to procurement delays (ALMA 2011), fund 
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disbursement delays (Lane and Glassman 2008, Celasun and Walliser 2007), and among others 
insufficient visibility of stock levels in peripheral health facilities (Shretta and Yadav 2012). While the 
existing literature does include rich contextual observations of stockouts however, rigorous quantitative 
research on their causes is lacking. This paper is an empirical study of the relationship between national 
stockout risks for health products purchased with Global Fund grants in Africa and the legacy process 
used by the Global Fund between 2002 and 2013 for performance monitoring and procurement fund 
disbursements. Specifically, we leverage publicly available historical fund disbursement and drug 
procurement data for Global Fund grants in Africa to build a discrete-event inventory simulation model 
predicting the joint impact of procurement and grant disbursement processes on national drug availability 
in recipient countries. This model is validated against cumulative stockout levels inferred from historical 
grant implementation lengths, and used to evaluate potential high-level modifications of disbursement or 
procurement processes. Exemplifying the application of standard management science methods to address 
global health challenges (Garnett et al. 2011, Kraiselburd and Yadav 2013), this work may thus inform 
the policies of the Global Fund, but also other international financing institutions using performance-
based financing. 
After a review of existing related work in §2, we formulate, estimate and validate our strategic 
inventory model in §3. Section §4 presents the experiments performed with that model and their results, 
which are then discussed in §5. Concluding remarks along with an agenda for further research on global 
health procurement are presented in §6. In the remainder of this introduction, we provide additional 
background on the Global Fund’s funding process (in §1.1) and discuss various potential or actual 
interventions related to that process (in §1.2). 
1.1 The Global Fund’s grant funding process 
Following a Global Fund announcement of a funding round (roughly once a year), nominated 
organizations (governments, NGOs or private sector institutions) called principal recipients (PR) submit 
proposals for Global Fund financing for disease-specific programs. Global Fund approval of a total 
program budget sets out a disbursement schedule of successive reporting periods for the awarded grants, 
each typically three or six months (90 or 180 days). The reporting frequency used for each program is 
determined by the Global Fund’s perception of the risks associated with its implementation. 
Implementation risks could stem for example from overspending or lack of respect of budget lines, lack 
of suitable accounting software and procedure, excessive use of cash payments, absence of supporting 
documentation for expenditures, inadequate storage and distribution of pharmaceuticals, lack of 
transparent procedures to select or monitor subcontractors, data quality problems, etc..  After each period, 
PRs submit a progress report and fund disbursement request for the next period that must be consistent 
with the needs defined in the initial proposal. The first disbursement includes an additional “cash buffer” 
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of three months, and similar buffers may be subsequently approved by the Global Fund (Global Fund 
2012b).  
The Global Fund contracts local fund agents (academic institutions, private management 
consulting firms) to act on their behalf and to audit and assess programs. Based on the recommendations 
of these local agents, the Global Fund may issue program evaluation scores including: 
• A - meeting or exceeding performance expectations;  
• B1 – adequate performance;  
• B2 - inadequate performance but with demonstrated potential; and 
• C - unacceptably poor performance; may be discontinued. 
Based in principle on these scores, the Global Fund will determine its response to disbursement requests 
in each period. The procedure is repeated every period, with the most recent evaluation score being from 
the preceding period. Disbursement delays are common, and may for example result from missing 
documentation, PRs not completing performance-related preconditions identified by fund agents, or 
resource constraints affecting either the Global Fund or PRs. Because grants occasionally get 
discontinued due to poor performance and public financing is distrusted in low-income countries, 
disbursement completion is nearly always required before associated procurement orders can be placed 
from vendors. Therefore disbursement delays can prompt emergency searches for alternative funding 
sources and/or affect the continuity of the local drug supply (Brugha et al. 2004).  
Historically, the first two years of a grant were called Phase I, which recipients could often extend 
by a few months through specific ad-hoc requests. To ensure more predictable long-term funding beyond 
that first phase, recipients could then submit funding continuation applications for another three years 
called Phase II. Formal evaluations by the Global Fund during Phase I have been far less systematic than 
during Phase II.  
1.2 Process modifications considered by the Global Fund 
To reduce stockouts of medicines at the national level, several interventions related to the Global 
Fund financing and procurement processes have been introduced or considered. They include Voluntary 
Pooled Procurement, which makes procurement services available to grant recipients (GFPSS 2012);  
Pledge Guarantee for Health, a bridge financing scheme developed by the United Nations Foundation to 
provide funds for the period between grant approval and disbursement (United Nations Development 
Fund 2011); and international or regional buffer stocks designed to reduce procurement lead times 
(Global Fund 2011). In late 2012, the Global Fund announced an intention to completely redesign its 
legacy funding process (Global Fund 2013). While the core principles, methods for investment project 
selection and financing allocation are already in place, detailed operational features related to 
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procurement and disbursement are still being refined at the time of writing, and we hope that the present 
paper may inform the operational aspects of this initiative. 
2. Related Literature 
Existing quantitative studies of Global Fund grant operations have examined the factors 
influencing grant evaluation scores (Radalet and Siddiqi 2007) and cumulative disbursements (Cohen, 
Singh and O’Brien 2008, Lu et al. 2006). Fan et al. (2013) have recently argued that current incentives 
mechanisms are not adequate as performance ratings are not replicable by external observers and not 
sufficiently connected with actual funding decisions. Our work extends this stream of research by 
characterizing the factors affecting Global Fund disbursement and procurement lead-times, and by 
quantifying the link between these lead-times and the risks of national stockouts of health products faced 
by Global Fund grant recipients in Africa.  
There is also a recent body of work on operational issues related to donor funding for global 
health that is relevant to large-scale subsidy programs. In particular, Tougher et al. (2012) provide an 
empirical study of the Affordable Medicines Facility for malaria commodities program (AMFm) showing 
that subsidies combined with supporting interventions can rapidly improve availability, price and market 
share of quality-assured artemisinin-based combination therapies. Theoretical models of subsidies include 
Taylor and Xiao (2014), which consider the effectiveness of sales vs. purchase subsidies in improving the 
availability of malaria drugs, and show that the donor should only subsidize purchases and not sales; Levi 
et al. (2014) analyze an optimization model to show that uniform subsidies to competing manufacturers 
do maximize consumption under some assumptions. In contrast, our work focuses on grants to be used for 
full payment of procurement by grant recipients (as opposed to subsidies), which is the traditional and 
predominant funding channel for the Global Fund.  
Another theoretical analysis related to our work is Natarajan and Swaminathan (2012), which 
characterizes the optimal procurement policy for a health product in the presence of funding uncertainty 
over a finite time horizon. While their mathematical model is therefore closely related to our work, our 
intended contribution is an empirical one that focuses on the Global Fund and performance-based 
funding. This contextual focus is motivated by the dominant role currently played by the Global Fund in 
the global financing of procurement for health products relative to other agencies such as UNICEF that 
primarily support in-country implementations of health programs and use more traditional fund transfer 
mechanisms. This has important modeling implications, because under the performance-based funding 
mechanism used by the Global Fund, grant recipients submitting fund disbursement requests are required 
to document the satisfactory use of funds previously disbursed during past grant review periods, 
consistent with the initial grant agreement (see §1.1). Global Fund grant recipients therefore have strong 
incentives to commit funds quickly after their disbursements. This can be verified empirically from our 
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dataset, where 79% of the 3027 procurement orders funded by Global Fund grants between 2008 and 
2012 were placed in the two weeks around a fund disbursement, even though the Global Fund grants we 
consider involve disbursement inter-arrival times of three to six months (delays of up to two weeks 
between disbursement approval notification and actual fund transfer are observed). Given the various 
steps involved in public procurement processes and related data entry issues, it is also possible that many 
of the remaining 21% of orders were in fact committed in the days following a fund disbursement. This 
justifies our model assumption that procurement orders are placed immediately after fund disbursements, 
and the procurement policy of Global Fund recipients (order timing and quantity decisions) is in effect 
entirely determined by the disbursement schedule. In contrast, Natarajan and Swaminathan (2012) derive 
the optimal inventory policy for a more traditional and less constrained theoretical procurement model 
involving inventory holding costs and interest income for unused funds, and where there is no 
endogenous relationship between the use of funds by recipients and the timing of future disbursements. 
Hence, the focus of our work is on the empirical link between stockout risks and the grant-recipient 
interaction process, rather than determining an optimal procurement policy. Notably, both papers 
establish in their respective motivating contexts that uncertainty in disbursement timing has a substantial 
negative impact on service levels. 
Finally, our work includes a case study on the operations of a major global health organization, 
and an empirical analysis of related data resulting in validated distributional forecasts of procurement lead 
times for several important categories of health products in Africa. Other references providing contextual 
information and data about global health supply chains include Yadav (2007), who qualitatively discusses 
long and unpredictable procurement lead times for essential commodities in Zambia and their relation to 
drug stock-outs; and Gallien et al. (2014), which contains a detailed case study of the public distribution 
of pharmaceuticals in Zambia and presents related datasets and a validated simulation model.    
3. Simulation Model 
Our simulation model is designed to characterize the relationship between actual disbursement 
lead-times linked to the Global Fund performance monitoring process, actual procurement lead-times for 
health products, and the risks of national stockouts in African countries receiving Global Fund grants. In 
addition, we want to evaluate the relative effectiveness of various possible strategic interventions for 
reducing these stockout risks (see §1.2). We emphasize that our objective is therefore not to develop 
realistic predictions of inventory levels of actual products in specific facilities of recipient countries at any 
point in time. Such an objective would likely imply a considerably more complex model than is 
formulated here, and require more detailed data than was available to us for this study (see §3.4 for a 
related discussion). 
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To achieve our goals, we first perform econometric analyses of historical disbursement inter-
arrival times (DITs) and procurement lead times (PLTs) associated with Global Fund procurement grants 
from 2002 to 2013. We then leverage these analyses to construct distributional forecasts of DITs and 
PLTs, and perform out-of-sample validations of these forecasts. We then consider a simple discrete-event 
model relying on these distributional forecasts of DITs and PLTs to simulate the inventory level of a 
single commodity in a central location when subjected to such disbursement and procurement lead-times. 
Finally, we perform an out-of-sample validation of this model’s predictions against the cumulative 
stockout levels inferred from historical grant implementation lengths obtained from public sources, and 
use this model to generate insights about potential high-level modifications of disbursement or 
procurement processes. Figure 1 provides a schematic methodology overview. 
[Figure 1] 
In the remainder of this section we present a precise definition of our model in §3.1, describe in §3.2 the 
methods followed for estimating model input data, discuss the results of a model validation experiment in 
§3.3, and finally provide a qualitative discussion of the main model assumptions in §3.4. 
3.1 Model definition 
Our discrete-event model simulates the inventory level of a single health product in a central 
location for each country, before that inventory is shipped to patient-facing health facilities. In many 
countries, this central location would correspond to the national warehouse where public procurement 
orders are delivered. As we do not model potential changes in health product prices, inventory levels and 
disbursement amounts are both measured in duration of demand coverage. The model is instantiated for 
principal recipients in 53 African countries, the five types of health products procured with Global Fund 
grants (anti-malarial, anti-tuberculosis, anti-retroviral, malaria prevention and HIV prevention), and 90 
and 180-day grant reporting periods. Baseline simulation dynamics rely on the following steps (Figure 2 
provides a sample simulation replication output for illustration): 
• The initial inventory available at the time origin equals 6 months of demand, which corresponds 
to the initial disbursement cash buffer and recommended inventory level stated in several existing 
guidelines for preventing stockouts (Ministry of Health, Uganda 2012, Global Fund 2006).  The 
initial grant rating is set to the most frequent rating in the historical disbursement database for the 
principal recipient considered (see §3.2); 
• Subsequent demand depletes available inventory at a constant and deterministic rate. Demand 
occurring when there is no inventory is recorded as lost; 
• From either simulation time origin or the time of a grant disbursement, the time duration before 
the next grant disbursement is simulated as a random realization of the distributional forecast of 
DIT corresponding to that country’s region, the grant period considered, and the grant rating 
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corresponding to the previous period (see §3.2). As the simulation moves to the next reporting 
period, a new grant rating is simulated by an independent random draw consistent with the grant 
rating transition frequencies estimated from the historical disbursement data for that principal 
recipient. The default disbursement amount corresponds to the procurement funds necessary to 
cover demand for one grant period (90 or 180 days) plus 10% of additional funding, i.e. a cash 
buffer level of 10% of the demand per period; 
• Each grant disbursement is immediately and entirely committed to a procurement order for the 
product. The quantity purchased then is added to the inventory after a lead time obtained as an 
independent random realization of the distributional forecast for PLT corresponding to that 
country’s region, whether it is landlocked, and the product type (see §3.2).  
[Figure 2] 
In each simulation replication the fraction of demand lost over the first three years (duration of 
Phase II) and the time required to fulfil three years of demand from inventory are recorded. For sensitivity 
analysis the initial inventory coverage is varied between 0 and 9 months in increments of 3 months and 
the cash buffer level is varied between -20% and 100% in increments of 10%  - variations around the 
baseline of 6 months of inventory on hand and 10% discretionary cash buffer suggested by the Global 
Fund (Global Fund 2012b). In the Phase I scenario DITs are generated according to estimations from 
Phase I data only. 
Using this model we can consider three possible major interventions related to Global Fund 
financing and procurement processes (see §1.2), simulated as follows: 
• Instantaneous Replenishment (IR): PLTs are set to zero to represent immediate delivery of all 
procurement orders e.g., from an international or regional buffer stock (warehouse managed by a 
third-party for the purpose of storing inventory closer to the PR and thus reducing procurement 
lead times, Global Fund 2011); 
• Bridge Financing (BF): a third party loan for an amount equal to the next anticipated 
disbursement triggers advance procurement order placement whenever the DIT exceeds the grant 
period length, consistent with the definition of Pledge Guarantee for Health (United Nations 
Development Fund 2011). Grant disbursements following such loans are paid back to the lender, 
and financing costs are ignored; 
• Synchronized Financing (SF): grant disbursement amounts are increased to cover one and a half 
reporting period, i.e. cash buffer level is set to 50%. Overall grant budget is unchanged so that 
disbursements stop when budget is exhausted, i.e. funding is gradually moved forward in time or 
front-loaded (Natarajan and Swaminathan 2012) but the total amount disbursed over the grant 
lifecycle remains the same.  
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3.2 Input data estimation 
Procurement lead time (PLT) is defined as the number of days from order placement to product 
delivery. For estimation purposes, historical PLTs are obtained from the publicly available Price and 
Quality Reporting database maintained by the Global Fund, where each principal recipient of a 
procurement grant is required to report all purchases of health products from the following five 
categories: anti-retroviral drugs, anti-malarial drugs, anti-tuberculosis drugs and prevention of malaria 
and HIV (Global Fund 2012c). Using this dataset, we estimate a number of econometric models to 
identify the main factors affecting PLTs (e.g., product category, geographic region, whether the country is 
landlocked…), define data categories to remove the predictable variability associated with the value of 
these factors, then construct a distributional forecast of PLT for each principal recipient in each data 
category. Finally, we validate the predictive accuracy of these forecasts using repeated out-of-sample 
evaluation of their predictive accuracy using 1000 randomly selected partitions of the dataset into separate 
estimation and evaluation sub-samples. For each partition, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to 
compare the distributional forecast estimated in-sample and the empirical out-of-sample distribution of 
PLTs (Arlot and Celisse 2010).  As a maximum of 67‰ repetitions (mean 46‰) were rejected at the 5% 
significance level across all data categories for that test, we conclude that our model of PLTs seems 
suitably accurate for our purposes (Section A1 of the supplementary material provides more details on 
this analysis, including the complete econometric study of PLTs). 
To estimate disbursement inter-arrival times (DITs), we consider a dataset of 2068 disbursements 
from the Global Fund to principal recipients in 53 countries in Africa from January 2005 to June 2012, 
which we obtained from the Global Fund web site (Global Fund 2012d). The variables in this dataset 
include grant number and disease program funded, disbursement date, reporting period start and end date, 
and when applicable rating for the previous reporting period data. Disbursements within the first two 
years of each grant lifecycle are identified as Phase I, all others as Phase II. Disbursement inter-arrival 
times are calculated as the number of days between disbursements in consecutive periods of the same 
grant. For each principal recipient we construct a distributional forecast of DIT conditional on the grant 
rating in the previous period, then perform an out-of-sample validation of this forecast using a 
methodology similar to the one previously described for estimating PLTs (details provided in section A1 
of the supplementary material). 
Finally, frequencies of grant rating transitions in Phase II are estimated for each principal 
recipient from the disbursement dataset just described as the fraction of past periods with rating i when 
the next period rating was j with (݅, ݆) ∈ ሼܣ, ܤ1, ܤ2, ܥሽ (see §1.1). 
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3.3 Model validation 
The goal of our model validation exercise is to evaluate the predictive accuracy of our main 
simulation model output, namely level of national stockouts over a grant lifecycle. This presents a 
methodological challenge however, because despite the widely reported prevalence of national stockouts 
for essential medicines in Africa (see references cited in §1), we are not aware of any readily available 
dataset systematically documenting the historical national stockout episodes of any African country, let 
alone for all of Africa. Because of the public health impact of stockouts, this data is associated with 
management performance and political accountability, which makes it sensitive and/or confidential. To 
overcome this challenge, we chose instead to base our validation on actual versus simulated 
implementation lengths of Global Fund grants. This is meaningful because the grants supported by the 
Global Fund have a fixed total budget determined upfront in each phase and designed to precisely cover 
health program needs without interruptions over the grant implementation period planned at the outset 
(e.g., 3 years for Phase II). As a result, whenever an actual grant implementation period is longer than the 
implementation period planned initially for that grant, that difference corresponds to a shortfall in the 
procurement funds available to cover demand for the health products purchased over the actual grant 
lifecycle, and therefore indicates a commensurate risk of national stockouts (see §3.4 for related 
interpretation guidelines). For analysis purposes, we focus on data related to grants in Phase II, because in 
contrast with Phase I their planned implementation periods are all the same (three years) as they are not 
eligible for potential extensions (see §1.1). We formally define the actual grant implementation period as 
the time between the first and last disbursement recorded for Phase II in the available historical grant 
records (see below), plus the duration of one grant review period (90 or 180 days) corrected by a 
multiplier accounting for the assumed cash buffer level. Given the data available to us, that definition 
corresponds to our best estimate of the actual time period over which the funds from Phase II of that grant 
were used. 
Using the previous definition, we compute the estimated actual implementation lengths for all 
429 grants to 62 principal recipients with at least three grants starting before 1 January 2007 recorded in 
the grant disbursement dataset available from the Global Fund website (Global Fund 2012d), and 
compare these with the actual implementation lengths simulated by our model out-of-sample. More 
specifically, we select around 80% of each principal recipient’s grants (total 347 grants) for estimation of 
PLT, DIT and rating transition probabilities, and use the remaining 82 grants for out-of-sample validation. 
We evaluate ranked probability scores of the out-of-sample observations against the distributional 
predictions of the in-sample data simulation (Taylor 2012). Fractions of observations falling below the θ-
quantiles of the density forecasts (hit fractions) and their 90% acceptance regions are calculated for θ 
between 0.25 and 0.95 in increments of 0.1. 
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Our baseline simulation parameters (6 months of initial inventory and 10% cash buffer level, see 
§3.1) minimize ranked probability score across 347 in-sample grants. Table 3 shows average simulated 
in-sample implementation lengths obtained with these baseline parameters, against average actual in-
sample and out-of-sample implementation lengths. Out-of-sample simulated implementation lengths of 
90-day grants (resp. 180-day grants) are on average 2.9% shorter (resp. 2.4% longer) than actual values in 
Phase I (resp. Phase II), and for 180-day reporting grants these average relative prediction errors are 
+6.7% in Phase I and +4.0% in Phase II. 
[Table 3] 
Figure 3 shows the hit fraction of out-of-sample observations below selected quantiles of the 
predicted implementation length distribution, along with the corresponding 90% acceptance region. The 
hypothesis that the out-of-sample observations are drawn from the simulated distributional predictions 
cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level. 
[Figure 3] 
From the validation results shown in Table 3 and Figure 3, we conclude that the simple simulation 
model and associated data estimation procedures defined in §3.1 and §3.2 seemingly provide suitably 
accurate predictions given our study objectives, both on average and in distribution, despite the salient 
assumptions underlying this model. We emphasize again here that the present paper does not aim 
theoretical contributions but rather empirical contributions relative to the specific context of the Global 
Fund, so that the validation study just presented arguably constitutes an appropriate instrument for 
evaluating the realism of our model and its assumptions. For completeness however, the following section 
provides a qualitative discussion of possible discrepancies between that model and the reality it 
represents, and offers guidelines for interpreting results. 
3.4 Qualitative model discussion 
An important assumption of our model is that the amount of demand for medicines that may be 
satisfied by a given disbursement amount (funding-to-demand ratio) is constant and deterministic. That is, 
we assume that potential changes in demand and/or prices of health products potentially affecting the 
demand coverage associated with given funds are predictable and accounted for in the disbursement 
amounts. Although much attention and expertise is in principle dedicated to determining and reviewing 
the grant amounts requested from the Global Fund (see §1.1), in practice this assumption may or may not 
be perfectly satisfied. An important related observation however is that the demand for health products 
that is relevant to Global Fund grants occurs at the national level and therefore exhibits limited variability 
because it is obtained by pooling demand across multiple geographic regions of an entire country. In 
addition, that demand tends to be unaffected by sudden local epidemics (e.g., cholera, yellow fever, 
polio), because of limitations in the categories of products that can be purchased with Global Fund grants 
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as well as the time flexibility of these grants, so that other short-term funding mechanisms are typically 
used instead to fight these. 
 Furthermore, demand for health products supported by some Global Fund grant component may 
in some cases span multiple medicines with possible interactions among them. In addition, that demand 
may exhibit seasonality and unpredictable variability. In contrast, our simple model assumes a 
deterministic and constant funding-to-demand ratio and considers a single product at a time. Tender-
related delays, which our model ignores, may also occur between fund disbursement and order placement. 
We believe that all assumptions just mentioned lead to under-estimating stockout risks. DITs and PLTs 
are also assumed to be independent from the inventory level, which ignores the possibility that specific 
actions by Global Fund or principal recipients when inventory levels are low (e.g., higher priority of 
disbursement request, expedited transportation) could reduce them. An argument in support of this 
assumption is that the Global Fund does not currently have centralized visibility of the inventory levels of 
relevant health products in recipient countries, so that its ability to rationally prioritize in the short term 
between different disbursement or procurement requests may be limited. Because some reliable inventory 
level information may still be communicated to the Global Fund in an ad-hoc manner however, this 
assumption may still result in an over-estimation of stockout risks. 
This model also implicitly assumes that countries do not have access to alternative sources of 
funding when gaps in Global Fund grant disbursements occur. In principle, countries may be able to 
access emergency funds through temporary reallocations between different budget lines or between grants 
from different donors. In practice however, it is suggested in Kraiselburd and Yadav 2013 that these 
emergency fund reallocations are limited because of constraints linked to fund traceability and 
transparency. In addition, data suggests that in many low-income countries, available sources of funding 
for health programs other than Global Fund grants are often limited (see section A2 of the supplementary 
material). 
We finally stress that, as a result of our model definition, the simulation results to be presented 
next in §4 do not constitute unqualified predictions of how much patient demand may actually be lost. 
Health product stockouts at the central level would only occur when alternative sources of funding cannot 
be accessed in time, and these stockouts would only affect patients when existing buffer inventories in the 
distribution system are insufficient. Developing such predictions would therefore require accurate models 
of alternative funding and distribution systems, models that would likely be both highly idiosyncratic and 
complex (Shretta and Yadav 2012). Rather, our results quantify intrinsic stockout risks, or coverage gaps 
in central level demand for health products that are to be expected from historical disbursement and 
procurement lead-times when implementing grants financed by the Global Fund. These findings are still 
meaningful, because intrinsic reliance on costly or disruptive backup mechanisms to guarantee supply 
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continuity is undesirable (Brugha et al. 2004). Furthermore, the substantial medicine stockouts reported in 
Global Fund recipient countries suggest that these backup mechanisms often fail in Africa (Global Fund 
2009, Oliynyk 2011). 
4. Results 
We first review our DIT and PLT estimates in §4.1, then the results of our baseline simulations in §4.2 
and policy intervention simulations in §4.3. Finally, we discuss related sensitivity analyses in §4.4. 
4.1 Parameter estimates 
Table 1 shows summary statistics of estimated PLT distributional forecasts. They show 
substantial variations of procurement lead-times across product types (HIV prevention and treatment 
products take 46 days less and 18 days more than malaria prevention products on average, respectively) 
and geographic conditions (deliveries to East Africa take 29 more days on average than to West & Central 
Africa, and landlocked countries take on average 20 more days than non-landlocked ones). The results 
also suggest that unpredictable variability of PLT within categories is substantial (average coefficient of 
variation is 0.657).  
[Table 1] 
Summary statistics of estimated DIT distributional forecasts in Table 2 also exhibit substantial 
variations across prior grant rating and geographic region. On average, DITs in East Africa are 40–45 
days longer than in West & Central Africa; DITs of 180-day grants in Phase I are 33 days longer than in 
Phase II; and DITs of 90-day non-rated grants in Phase II were 80 days longer than those rated “A”. 
Unpredictable variability of DIT within each category is also substantial (mean coefficient of variation is 
0.508). Consistent with previous independent observations (Aidspan 2005), mean DIT is larger than grant 
reporting period in 19 out of the 24 categories, including all categories with 90-day reporting periods. 
Finally, no significant time trend of DIT during a grant’s lifecycle is observed.  
[Table 2] 
4.2 Baseline simulations 
Table 4 reports simulated average proportion of demand lost over three years under baseline 
assumptions. Mean lost demand across simulated scenarios is 18.8%, with values ranging from less than 
3% for 180-day Malaria grants (used for procurement of anti-malarial and malaria prevention health 
products) in West & Central Africa to more than 48% for 90-day tuberculosis grants in East Africa. The 
most substantial variability driver is the grant reporting period, with expected lost demand for 90-day 
reporting grants ranging from 4 to 20 times that of 180-day grants for the same disease and country – 48% 
vs. 11 % for anti-tuberculous drugs in Ethiopia and 22% vs. 1% for ARV drugs in Ghana. Overall average 
lost demand is 5.3% for 180-day grants versus 32.4% for 90-day grants.  
[Table 4] 
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Variability across regions is also substantial, with expected lost demand for 90-day (resp. 180-
day) reporting grants ranging from around 21% (resp. 2.3%) in West and Central Africa to around 46% 
(resp. 10.6%) in East Africa. Within regions differences between countries are limited, and there were no 
systematic differences between landlocked and non-landlocked countries (full table of results for all 
countries available in the supplementary material). In North and West & Central Africa expected lost 
demand did not vary significantly across health product types. In South Africa however expected 
stockouts for anti-tuberculous drugs were more than 5 percentage points higher than all other health 
products. In East Africa this difference was not as high, but still significant at 2 percentage points. 
4.3 Policy interventions 
Table 5 reports expected stockouts over three years for the main baseline scenario and policy 
interventions considered. 90-day reporting grants in Phase I have similar expected stockouts as in Phase 
II, except in East Africa where they are markedly higher (55.1% vs. 40.8%). In contrast, 180-day 
reporting grants had lower stockouts in Phase I in all African regions. 
[Table 5] 
Instantaneous replenishment decreases expected stockouts between 4.8 and 7.3 percentage points 
for 90-day grants, and between 1.9 and 5.8pp for 180-day grants. Bridge financing achieves lower 
stockout reductions than instantaneous replenishment, also leaving stockout risks for 90-day grants at 
relatively high levels (minimum 16% in West and Central Africa). Finally, synchronized financing is the 
single most effective policy for reducing expected stockouts of 90-day reporting grants, achieving 
reductions between 13 percentage points in West & Central Africa and 16 percentage points in North 
Africa. Its stockout risks for 180-day grants are also low and comparable to those achieved by 
instantaneous replenishment.  
Expected stockout levels in all instances are highest in East Africa due to the significantly longer 
historical PLTs and DITs as indicated in Tables 1-2, and Figures S4-S5. The large number of simulation 
replications ensures that the quantitative differences between SF and the other scenarios in Table 5 are 
statistically significant at 98% confidence level (and often higher).  
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
Figure 4 reports the average simulated fraction of lost demand under baseline parameters over 
various time horizons, with results across different African countries weighted as before. 
[Figure 4] 
After an initial period of 6 months corresponding to the initial inventory assumed, the fraction of 
lost demand increases steadily over time for both types (90-day reporting and 180-day reporting) of grants 
and all interventions except synchronized financing. Contrasting with the 3-year results shown in Table 5, 
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expected lost demand under instantaneous replenishment is lower than with synchronized financing up to 
day 475 (resp. 960) for 90-day (resp. 180-day) reporting grants.  
Figure 5 shows how the effects of the cash buffer level on simulated lost demand vary by 
geographic region. Due to specific DITs, expected stockout risks in East Africa remain at higher levels 
than in all other regions with increased cash buffer levels. Differences between simulated stockout risks in 
North, South and West Africa diminished for higher cash buffer levels, particularly for 180-day reporting 
grants. Given the small estimation sample sizes for some categories of DITs associated with East Africa 
seen in Table 2, we verified that these results are robust to the combination or exclusion of all DIT 
categories with less than 5 data points. 
[Figure 5] 
The analyses of sensitivity relative to the initial inventory and replenishment frequency included 
in section A3 of the supplementary material also suggested that the relative simulated impact of these 
interventions is robust to these parameters. 
5. Discussion 
5.1 The Global Fund procurement funding process from 2002 to 2013 
Our distributional forecasting results show that both financial and physical flows related to the 
supply continuity of health products purchased with Global Fund grants exhibit substantial unpredictable 
variability - average coefficient of variation of 0.657 and 0.508 for DITs and PLTs, respectively. 
Furthermore, a high proportion of historical observations have DIT longer than the grant reporting period, 
particularly for 90-day period grants (see Table 2). This is meaningful because while the first 
disbursement in each Global Fund grant may include buffer funds, by default all subsequent 
disbursements cover health program needs defined in the initial grant agreement for exactly one reporting 
period (GFPSS 2012). Our empirical study of DITs therefore demonstrates that the Global Fund’s 
disbursement schedules are highly heterogeneous across regions, exhibit substantial unpredictable 
variability and are frequently slower than the health programs they are designed to support. 
Our simulation model is designed to evaluate the combined impact of these unpredictable 
financial and physical flows on the national stockouts of health products for African grant recipients of 
the Global Fund. The high level of national stockout risks that it predicts is striking (average simulated 
proportion of demand lost over three years was 28.7% across 90-day grants, and up to 45% for 
tuberculosis grants in East Africa), and the substantial variability of these stockout risks across 
geographic region and product type (e.g., 56.3% for TB 90-day reporting grants in Burundi vs. 40.0% for 
the corresponding anti-malaria procurement grants in Rwanda) seems hard to rationalize from a public 
health or performance monitoring standpoint. The most striking result from this study is arguably that the 
grants for which concerns about performance or implementation risks led the Global Fund to use a shorter 
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reporting period of 90 days clearly faced substantially higher national stockout risks (28.7% for 90-day 
vs. 5.3% for 180-day reporting grants). In other words, over the first 11 years of the Global Fund there 
was a clear effective trade-off between the extent of its performance monitoring activities and the 
effectiveness of the funds it disbursed; we further discuss this finding in §5.2.  
Synchronized financing, which makes disbursement amounts commensurate with empirical DITs, 
is the only considered intervention substantially reducing stockout risks for 90-day grants (by between 13 
and 16 percentage points over three years, depending on the region). Implementation of synchronized 
financing would require clear guidelines for determining more customized disbursement schedules, and 
the results from Figure 5 suggest that further benefits could be obtained with different cash buffer levels 
across regions.  
Instantaneous replenishment, an idealized scenario eliminating PLT but leaving financial flows 
unchanged, would benefit 180-day grants but leave 90-day grants with high levels of stockout exposure. 
This poor targeting efficiency is consistent with the greater discrepancy between disbursement amounts 
and frequency observed for 90-day grants, which is unaffected by PLT reductions. 
Finally, the predicted impact of bridge financing is also limited. Our explanation is that bridge 
financing, while making some funds available earlier, changes neither the amount nor the frequency of 
the underlying Global Fund disbursement schedule (consistent with the Pledge Guarantee for Health 
scheme promoted by the United Nations Development Fund, see §3.1 and United Nations Development 
Fund 2011). Hence, bridge financing does not address the structural problem of disbursement timing and 
amount and does not constitute a reliable process for preventing stockouts. Alternative mechanisms are 
conceivable, but any implementation increasing disbursement frequency would expose third-party lenders 
to financial liability accumulating over time.   
5.2 Implications for policy and practice  
A key implication of these results for the Global Fund is that adjusting disbursement amounts 
through a more systematic use of cash buffers reflecting actual disbursement schedules would 
substantially benefit public health, and appears more effective than other possible interventions 
considered here. Table 4 suggests countries to be targeted in priority for this intervention, and indicates 
that it may be very time-sensitive in many cases. More generally, under the performance monitoring 
processes used by the Global Fund from 2002 to 2013, any intervention effectively resulting in less 
frequent and larger disbursements and/or less variable DITs is likely to decrease stockout risks. 
The highlighted substantial intrinsic stockout risks faced by many Global Fund recipients since 
2002 seem significant to global health. This may motivate a more extensive redesign of the Global Fund’s 
funding model than the changes we could evaluate in this paper on the basis of historical DIT data, and 
may have motivated the new funding model initiative announced by the Global Fund in 2013 (Global 
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Fund 2013a). Indeed, all the interventions considered in our quantitative study essentially assume that the 
process used by the Global Fund for the purpose of monitoring the performance of grant recipients would 
remain unchanged relative to the collection period of our DIT data from 2002 to 2013, or at least that any 
changes considered will not impact the distribution of disbursement inter-arrival times. However, our 
study and model do provide a framework for thinking about further redesign opportunities for this process 
in a systematic manner. 
Firstly, the assumed lack of correlation between inventory level and DIT points to the current lack 
of centralized country stock level information accessible to the Global Fund on a routine basis for the 
health products that it is funding.  This situation is particularly problematic when Global Fund managers 
are confronted with several competing solicitations for expediting disbursements or allocating limited 
stock or funds available to them in the short term, as this lack of information may contribute to inefficient 
decisions with severe consequences. This information scarcity also complicates the development of 
proactive and forward-looking approaches for allocating funds and resources, contrasting with the 
reactive “fire-fighting” environment generated by emergency solicitations of recipient countries facing an 
existing or imminent stock-out crisis (a key motivation for the support of this study by the Global Fund). 
Finally, this lack of reliable centralized stock level information makes it difficult for the Global Fund to 
evaluate the performance of recipient countries in relation to inventory management, and therefore 
hampers its core performance monitoring function. 
Secondly, the substantially higher stockout risks associated with 90 day grants warrant a detailed 
examination of whether the relative benefits of these grants in terms of management incentives are 
commensurate. It is noteworthy that, because of the Global Fund’s historical practices, the long DITs 
estimated in our study may have been caused by issues affecting any of the activities associated with the 
execution of a grant, including activities having nothing to do with the procurement of health 
commodities. For example, a delay with the complete documentation of expenses linked to the 
construction of a health clinic or an advertising program on condoms could conceivably postpone an 
incoming disbursement to be used primarily for procuring medicines. Because the short-term public 
health impact of delays affecting medicine procurement may be quite different from that of delays 
affecting other grant components, it would seem beneficial for the Global Fund to manage the schedule of 
procurement-related disbursements in a specific manner. We note that other donors also implementing 
performance-based funding principles such as the World Bank’s Health Results Innovation Trust Fund 
and the GAVI Alliance already separate payments into fixed/predictable and performance-based portions, 
presumably for the same reasons (Fan et al. 2013). Following this model, the Global Fund could further 
protect procurement-related disbursements by reducing their dependence on performance considerations, 
particularly when these considerations are unrelated to procurement. More generally, the trade-off 
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between fund effectiveness and financing predictability on the one hand and performance incentives on 
the other hand could be systematically managed in a segmented manner across different grant 
components, increasing overall efficiency. Alternative mechanisms for preserving patient access to 
medicines without compromising fund integrity include letters of credit directly issued to manufacturers 
and central procurement services such as Voluntary Pooled Procurement. However, it is not clear that the 
Global Fund systematically uses such alternative mechanisms when performance concerns related to 
procurement arise. 
Finally, another noteworthy result from our analysis is the high association of stockout risks and 
DITs with the geographic region of recipient countries. It is in principle possible that these geographic 
regions should actually coincide with some intrinsic features of recipient countries that would similarly 
affect the processes used for grant performance evaluations and disbursements. Given the heterogeneity 
of countries within these regions along many dimensions however, this explanation does not seem 
plausible (Berenguer et al. 2014). Rather, we have used for this analysis the exact definition of geographic 
regions used by the Global Fund for reporting purposes, and these regions are also reflected in its internal 
organizational structure (e.g., fund portfolio managers are predominantly only responsible for countries 
within a single region). These observations and our results therefore suggest instead that the processes 
used by the Global Fund for grant evaluation and disbursement purposes are inconsistent across regions, 
and that their inconsistencies have a predominant impact on DITs. This explanation aligns with 
observations made independently by Fan et al. (2013) on the basis of both econometric analysis of 
historical grant scores and detailed case studies of Global Fund decisions for several specific countries. 
Specifically, these authors highlight the lack of transparency and apparent subjectivity affecting the 
relationship between grant evaluation scores and actual disbursement decisions. Based on this collective 
evidence, it seems important for the Global Fund to develop measurements and processes for evaluating 
and acting upon grant management performance that are more objective, globally scalable, and immune 
from organizational idiosyncrasies. 
6. Conclusion and Future Research 
Our findings provide new evidence on the relationship between global health initiatives and national 
health systems by identifying and characterizing the link between the Global Fund’s financing and 
disbursement processes and national drug stockout risks over the past decade (WHO 2009). These results 
complement observational studies on health product stockouts in Africa (e.g., Pasquet et al. 2010, 
Oliynyk 2011) and qualitative studies discussing their causes by providing a validated model generating 
quantitative predictions of stockout risks and characterizing the role of disbursement and procurement 
variability (Shretta and Yadav 2012). Finally, our study provides hitherto unavailable quantitative 
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predictions of the impact of potential interventions for reducing these risks, and points to several process 
redesign opportunities for the Global Fund. 
This work and its context also motivate several opportunities for further research in the area of 
global health financing and procurement. As discussed in §3.4, the single-product model considered in 
this paper does seem appropriate for several categories of commodities purchased with Global Fund 
grants, and other related contexts such as the procurement of nutrition products by UNICEF (Natarajan 
and Swaminathan 2012). For other product categories (e.g. antibiotics) however, recipient countries may 
need to dynamically split incoming fund disbursements into procurement orders for different products on 
the basis of their currently available inventory, procurement lead-times and relative importance to public 
health; this motivates an interesting multi-product extension of the model presented here for which the 
assumptions in existing multi-product models such as Janakiraman et al. (2010) do not seem adapted. 
Another relevant research direction concerns the coordination between multiple funding streams. 
While funding from the Global Fund does tend to be dominant in recipient countries for the procurement 
of products associated with Malaria, Tuberculosis and HIV (see section A2 of the supplementary 
material), for many other health-related financial needs multiple sources of funding are often used 
simultaneously. Related questions include the assessment of shadow costs associated with restrictions on 
the use of specific external funds, and the associated design of an optimal funding strategy across multiple 
funds (Fundafunda and Yadav 2008 and Kraiselburd and Yadav 2013 provide relevant contextual 
information). 
Finally, the discussion in §5.2 illustrates that the relationship arising between an external donor 
such as the Global Fund and a recipient country in the context of performance-based funding also is a 
worthy object of study. A microeconomic model could shed some light on the optimal contractual form 
between donor and recipient in the context of performance-based funding, where the depth or frequency 
of auditing required by the donor to reduce the information asymmetry with the recipient country is an 
endogenous decision. While there exists a literature on principal-agent relationships with costly 
endogenous monitoring (e.g., Jost 1996), performance-based funding for health presents interesting 
specific features such as the impact of monitoring on the effectiveness of the funds provided, and the 
dynamic aspects of the relationship between donors and recipients. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Diagram of overall methodology. 
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Figure 2: Illustrative simulated inventory sample path. 
 
Notes: Grant period is 180 days. DIT1, DIT2, DIT3 and PLT1, PLT2, PLT3 denote successive realizations 
of DIT and PLT, respectively. In this illustration stockout occurs from May to July 2014 due to 
unavailability of funds and from July to October 2014 due to procurement lead time. 
 
 
Figure 3: Hit fractions of out-of-sample observations of grant implementation lengths relative to in-
sample simulated distribution. 
 
 
Notes: Hit percentages – fraction of out-of-sample observations - below θ quantile of the corresponding 
predicted implementation length distribution for θ between 0.25 and 0.95 in increments of 0.1; 90% 
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acceptance region for the null hypothesis that out-of-sample observations were realizations from the 
corresponding distributional forecasts of the simulation. 
 
Figure 4: Average simulated fraction of lost demand over various time horizons under baseline 
parameters and different interventions, aggregated across African countries: 90-day reporting 
grants (A) and 180-day reporting grants (B) 
 
 
 
Notes: National results weighted by estimated proportional demand; initial inventory of 6 months and 
cash buffer level of 10% for all scenarios except synchronized financing where it is 50% by definition; 
scenarios are Phase II (baseline), Phase I, IR – instantaneous replenishment, BF – bridge financing and SF 
– synchronized financing.  
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Figure 5: Average simulated fraction of lost demand for different cash buffer levels in each African 
region: 90-day reporting grants (A) and 180-day reporting grants (B) 
 
 
Notes: Results within regions weighted by estimated proportion of demand; baseline parameters assumed 
except for cash buffer level. Highlighted baseline is an aggregation of the results in Table 5, and cash 
buffer level of 50% corresponds to the synchronized financing intervention; scenarios are Phase II 
(baseline), Phase I, IR – instantaneous replenishment, BF – bridge financing and SF – synchronized 
financing. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of procurement lead times (PLT) in days.  
African 
region 
Landlocked 
(Y/N) 
Health Product Type 
Anti- 
Malarial 
Anti- 
Tuberculous 
Malaria 
Prevention 
HIV 
Prevention 
Anti- 
Retroviral 
݊  Mean  Quantiles ݊  Mean  Quantiles ݊  Mean  Quantiles ݊  Mean  Quantiles ݊  Mean  Quantiles 
East 
No 222   162   (31, 347)       222   162   (31, 347)   38   231  (112, 289)   61   100    (14, 236) 
273   133    (31, 241) 
Yes 
  87   128   (35, 266) 
  29   231 (112, 364)         29   231   (112, 364) 
  60    73      (13, 151) 
South Yes 181    76 (18, 229) †33  122   (52, 420)
166    98    (18, 243) 
North 
Yes   21   103   (29, 266) 11  160  (64, 234)        11   160   (64, 234)
  86    74      (17, 179) 
No ‡62   107   (23, 280) 
  69  122   (30, 263) 
‡62   107    (23, 280) 184    90     (11, 241) 
South No   53   146   (13, 297) †33   122   ( 52, 420) 110    54       (6, 151) 550    66       (8, 168) 
West & 
Central 
No 233   115   (13, 300)       233  115 (13, 300)       233  115 (13, 300) 115   84     (13, 217) 218   84       (9,243)
Yes   36   165     (5, 351)   18  159   (76, 206)           18   159    (76, 206)   25    93     (14, 228) 100  150    (27, 331) 
 
Notes: Number of observations, mean and (5%, 95%) quantiles of PLT in each category; categories were 
merged whenever the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of common underlying distribution had a p-value larger 
than 0.5; merged categories are identified by either an omitted cell border, †, or ‡. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of disbursement inter arrival times (DIT) in days. 
  Grant Rating 
 World 
Region 
A B1 B2 NR Phase I 
 ݊  Mean  Quantiles ݊  Mean  Quantiles ݊  Mean  Quantiles ݊  Mean  Quantiles ݊  Mean  Quantiles 
90-day 
Reporting 
Grants 
West & 
Central 
32 130 (35, 308) †64 139  (28, 367) 
19  146   (77, 222) 
356 149  (39, 321) 356 149  (39, 321) 
North 
17 184 (61, 359) 
15  163  (42, 349) 2 275  (177, 373) 
261 174  (44, 360) 
South 
†64 139  (28, 367) 
4 117  (76, 156) 
East 3 261 (168, 335)             1             334  56 186  (28, 367) 
180-day 
Reporting 
Grants 
North 24 178 (34, 357) 64  179  (61, 354) 23  125  (20, 223) 23   125  (20, 223) 53  238 (67, 383) 
West & 
Central 
57 159 (68, 294) 
132 154  (33, 270) 
11  135  (27, 211) 11  124   (40, 333) 95 192  (58, 369) 
South 
77 231 (124, 377) 
31  177  (26, 348) 23  154   (46, 323) 53  207 (66, 368) 
East 63  185  (35, 340) 11  260  (74, 391) 21  180   (31, 362) 103  206 (49, 371) 
 
Notes: Number of observations, mean and (5%, 95%) quantiles of DIT in each category; categories were 
merged whenever the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of common underlying distribution had a p-value larger 
than 0.5; merged categories are identified by either an omitted cell border or †. 
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Table 3: Mean grant implementation length (days), observed and simulated 95% confidence 
intervals.  
  Observed 
In-Sample 
Observed 
Out of Sample Simulated 
 Phase ݊ Mean 95% CI ݊ Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI 
90-day 
Reporting 
Grants 
I 96 841 (822, 860) 25 835 (800, 870) 811 (807, 815) 
II 47 1317 (1285, 1349) 12 1388 (1329, 1447) 1421 (1414,1428) 
180-day 
Reporting 
Grants 
I 251 779 (771, 787) 57 748 (734, 762) 798 (795, 801) 
II 105 1097 (1077, 1117) 18 1103 (1058, 1148) 1147 (1142,1152) 
 
Notes: Mean implementation length and 95% CI by phase and reporting frequency for actual in-sample 
and out-of-sample against simulated predictions generated from in-sample data using baseline parameter 
values. 
 
 
Table 4: Simulated average proportion of demand lost over three years by world region and 
country, type of drug and reporting frequency under baseline assumptions (percentage). 
 
 Health Product Type
 Anti- 
Malarial 
Anti- 
Retroviral 
Anti- 
Tuberculous 
HIV 
Prevention 
Malaria 
Prevention 
African region & 
Country 
Reporting Frequency (days) 
90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180
North Africa     
Landlocked           
Chad 28.05 3.11 27.91 2.81 31.43 5.15 29.61 2.17 31.24 5.28 
Mali 29.42 3.67 29.06 3.36 32.12 5.58 29.95 2.43 33.06 5.33 
Niger 31.16 3.88 31.76 3.19 33.42 5.46 31.14 2.02 34.57 5.25 
South Sudan 30.82 3.46 30.25 3.04 33.19 5.36 30.02 2.38 35.18 5.37 
Non-landlocked     
Algeria 26.11 2.63 26.76 2.13 26.81 3.08 25.41 2.36 26.66 2.86 
Djibouti 29.27 2.75 28.12 1.82 29.90 3.20 28.54 1.42 29.92 2.47 
Egypt 29.92 3.05 30.33 1.94 32.17 3.81 30.18 1.83 32.12 3.14 
Jordan  33.29 3.44 32.06 4.67 32.41 2.98   
Mauritania 31.37 4.64 32.28 3.97 33.62 4.81 32.47 2.70 34.61 4.56 
Morocco  31.47 3.85 32.05 3.62 30.12 2.51   
Somalia 30.61 3.42 30.38 2.51 32.14 3.29 30.37 2.11 31.62 3.72 
Tunisia  29.19 3.28 33.55 4.23 29.81 3.02   
Yemen 29.09 2.35 32.13 3.72 30.41 2.71 32.06 2.96 30.72 2.91 
East Africa     
Landlocked           
Burundi 43.49 12.61 49.83 12.88 56.34 12.90 51.27  9.21 50.17 11.62
Ethiopia 42.61   9.04 40.14   9.25 48.13 11.17 40.15   8.93 49.31 12.17 
Rwanda 39.97 10.18 38.65 10.09 44.27 10.05 45.83  8.14 44.53 11.48
Uganda 41.17   9.68 41.06 10.53 48.16 10.69 40.18   7.65 39.19 12.29 
Non-landlocked     
Comoros 43.21 10.58 43.69 11.68   44.66  9.82 42.23   9.04 
D.R. Congo  45.78 12.31 45.20 12.17 47.31 12.68 44.18 10.38 46.07 11.37
Eritrea 43.96 11.45 43.68 10.82 45.52 12.41 43.95 11.03 44.19 10.13 
Kenya 46.57 12.74 53.21 11.94 54.26 12.90 53.08 11.64 54.28 10.97 
Madagascar 46.79 10.18 46.37 12.18 47.20 11.65 46.79 11.92 52.31   7.14
Mauritius   54.37   9.02   52.80   8.29   
Tanzania 43.19 10.03 48.21  8.26 48.26 10.23 47.16  7.51 45.92   7.83
Zanzibar 40.22 11.66 42.05 10.31   41.83 10.03 39.70   8.27 
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South Africa     
Landlocked           
Botswana  33.26  4.13 41.57 5.78 32.72 3.91   
Lesotho   33.41   5.58 41.49  6.13 32.46  4.12   
Malawi 31.54  4.52 27.04  4.11 25.72 3.82 22.38   3.89
Swaziland 35.12   5.68 32.62   4.18 41.62  6.42 32.19  3.70 34.55   3.55 
Zambia 32.39  4.12 28.71  3.78 40.35 6.68 27.12 3.41 32.20   4.25
Zimbabwe 32.70   6.45 30.47   4.82 41.70  6.35 29.77  4.14 30.61   4.61 
Non-landlocked           
Angola 35.37  6.72 31.22  5.27 34.63 6.80 31.50  4.37 34.24   4.74
Mozambique 27.65   5.79 25.38   4.24 34.08  5.56 22.02   3.87 24.64   4.28 
Namibia 29.37  5.37 26.34  4.45 27.62 5.41 25.17  3.65 27.57   4.80
South Africa   28.26   4.71   27.16   3.30   
West &Central           
Landlocked     
Burkina Faso 22.61   4.13 24.05   4.38 21.31 2.29 22.32   1.39 21.38  2.90 
CAR 26.74  2.63 25.81  3.15 26.74 2.37 24.27  1.11 27.16  2.27 
Non-landlocked           
Benin 25.29   4.52 23.25   1.69 22.38 2.19 22.47   1.26 25.18   4.38 
Cameroon 23.10  2.80 22.06  3.14 24.40 3.45 22.52  2.65 24.62   3.55
Cape Verde 21.38   2.16 17.83   2.19   18.06   1.93 22.45   2.18 
Congo 19.26  2.76 22.45  1.23 18.83 1.79 23.26  1.36 18.32   2.63
Côte d'Ivoire 24.72   2.04 24.58   1.69 22.68 1.63 23.61   1.62 25.59   2.03 
Guinea 22.05  2.17 21.29  1.75 22.15 2.31 21.46  1.41 22.36   2.20
Equat. Guinea 24.17   2.08 21.57   2.02   22.73   1.75 23.71   2.16 
Gabon 18.29  2.74 18.04  2.50 18.16  1.80 18.48   2.72
Gambia 20.16   2.28 18.58   1.31 22.84 2.17 17.03   1.38 21.14   2.36 
Ghana 22.31  2.01 21.62  1.26 22.58 1.42 20.41  1.02 23.58   1.52
Guinea-Bissau 19.73   3.07 17.32   1.88 20.05 2.24 17.37   1.95 18.26   1.99 
Liberia 18.57  2.89 17.14  2.13 19.26 2.87 18.13  1.89 19.48   2.73 
Nigeria 21.42   2.52 22.45   1.92 23.78 2.18 21.69   1.74 21.53   2.19 
Senegal 18.25  2.71 20.18  1.81 18.66 2.91 18.53  1.68 18.73   2.65
Sierra Leone 19.34   2.39 20.92   1.74 21.47 2.53 20.03   1.72 19.96   2.78 
Togo 18.47  2.40 19.11  2.03 19.75 2.78 18.27  1.79 22.62   2.69
 
Notes: Results based on 5,000 simulated replications yielding a 95% CI length less than 0.8% of the 
estimated mean estimate in each scenario. Results from several PRs in same country were weighted by 
relative volume of approved GF grant amounts. Scenarios with no grant approved historically for a given 
country and disease were not simulated. 
 
Table 5: Simulated average proportion of demand lost over three years for baseline scenario (Phase 
II) and policy interventions (percentage). 
 
  Policy 
 Phase I Phase II IR BF SF 
 Reporting Frequency (days) 90        180 90         180 90      180 90         180 90         180 
 North  29.9%    1.1% 29.7%      3.4% 22.7%   0.8% 26.4%    2.1% 13.7%   1.06% 
World East 55.1%    5.8% 40.8%      9.1% 33.5%   3.3% 37.5%    6.8% 27.7%   3.08% 
Region South 29.3%    2.3% 24.9%      3.3% 20.1%   1.1% 22.3%    2.0% 10.1%    0.86% 
 West & Central 23.7%    2.0% 19.5%      2.4% 13.5%   0.5% 16.0%    1.7%  6.5%     0.85% 
 
Notes: Results based on 5,000 replications ensuring the length of the 95% confidence interval is less than 
1% of the estimated expected stockouts in each scenario; results across different drugs and within African 
region weighted by the number of reported malaria cases in 2010 for anti-malaria and malaria prevention 
drugs; sum of people in need of and on ARV treatment for ARV drugs; number of people living with 
AIDS for HIV prevention drugs; new TB cases in 2011 for anti-TB drugs (The Henry Kaiser Foundation 
2012). 
 
